

108TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 6

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to planning the reconstruction of Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 13, 2003

Mr. LIEBERMAN introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JOINT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to planning the reconstruction of Iraq.

Whereas the United States may soon confront the need to defend with military force its national security and the security of its allies from the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq;

Whereas such action will serve not only to end Saddam's pernicious threat to peace and security, but also to give the people of Iraq a new dawn of hope, liberated from a disgraceful tyrant who oppresses their liberty, abuses their humanity, and robs them of their future;

Whereas the President's January 20, 2003 report to Congress pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243) provides a brief conceptual overview of the future of Iraq

but provides no detail on executive branch planning or legislation that may be necessary and, most importantly, no estimates of the funding and other support from Congress that would be necessary for carrying out the reconstruction of Iraq;

Whereas Congress has become increasingly concerned that the President has not provided adequate information regarding plans for the reconstruction of Iraq following a war, should that eventuality arise;

Whereas United States experience with reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan offers useful lessons for improving future post-war reconstruction efforts;

Whereas the lessons learned during the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, a far less complex and difficult endeavor, suggest that United States policymakers should give careful attention to planning the task of reconstruction in Iraq following a war;

Whereas with Iraq the United States has the opportunity and the responsibility to avoid the mistakes made during the reconstruction of Afghanistan;

Whereas success in the reconstruction of Iraq will require answers to many critical questions in advance; and

Whereas United States actions in Iraq may well present the opportunity for diplomatic initiatives in the broader Middle East region: Now, therefore, be it

- 1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
- 2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 That it is the sense of Congress that the President
- 4 should—

1 (1) estimate the funds and resources that are
2 necessary for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq
3 and submit those estimates to Congress in order
4 that Congress may as quickly as feasible fulfill its
5 constitutional functions and ensure the timely avail-
6 ability of funds;

7 (2) design a transitional security force for Iraq,
8 taking into consideration—

9 (A) the oversight, authority, jurisdiction,
10 and mandate of the security force;

11 (B) the composition of the security force,
12 whether composed of United States military
13 personnel, civilians, or contractors, foreign na-
14 tionals, personnel or troops contributed by other
15 nations, or other individuals;

16 (C) the utility of asking other nations to
17 contribute to such a security force;

18 (D) plans to assure the personal security
19 of the interim Iraqi leadership; and

20 (E) the additional funds and personnel
21 that may be necessary for support of the secu-
22 rity force;

23 (3) develop a plan to reconstitute security, law,
24 and justice institutions in Iraq and to restore to
25 Iraqis the responsibility for managing their own af-

1 fairs as quickly as is practicable, taking into consid-
2 eration—

3 (A) actions necessary to dismantle Iraq's
4 military forces and its multiple security forces
5 and replace them with reconstituted military,
6 police, law enforcement, and judicial institu-
7 tions;

8 (B) standards and methods for recruiting
9 Iraqi nationals to those institutions and for
10 purging from the existing forces individuals
11 loyal to Saddam Hussein or guilty of serious
12 human rights abuses;

13 (C) the question of which officials in the
14 executive branch of the United States Govern-
15 ment are appropriate to perform United States
16 responsibilities for carrying out the plan; and

17 (D) the additional funds and personnel
18 that may be necessary to carry out the plan;

19 (4) develop a plan to respond to the humani-
20 tarian needs of an Iraqi population already in hu-
21 manitarian crisis, taking into consideration—

22 (A) mechanisms and methods for carrying
23 out humanitarian relief efforts;

24 (B) the appointment of a transition coordi-
25 nator, transitional administrator, or other indi-

vidual responsible for ensuring coordination of both civilian and military efforts to organize relief;

(C) the utility of urging Iraqi opposition groups to appoint individuals to undertake relief coordination, in cooperation with the coordinator, in order to avoid pursuing conflicting purposes, duplicating efforts, or so failing to address issues in a timely fashion that the issues become humanitarian disasters; and

(D) any need for a more robust response to calls for pledges toward a relief fund, a fund to which the United States has to date pledged only \$15,000,000;

(5) carefully consider the most crucial security threat, the need to secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical precursors, in order to ensure that they are neither stolen nor transferred to terrorists or other parties inimical to the United States during the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's government;

(6) develop measures necessary to temporarily steward Iraq's natural resources, in order to ensure that—

1 (A) Iraq's oil wealth is preserved so that it
2 may be directed, at long last, not toward con-
3 structing palaces and weapons of mass destruc-
4 tion, but instead toward fulfilling the needs and
5 future of the people of Iraq;

6 (B) Iraq's oil fields, particularly those in
7 the southern part of the country, are secured
8 from sabotage by Saddam Hussein as his re-
9 gime collapses;

10 (C) contingency plans exist to react to and
11 repair any damage Saddam Hussein may
12 choose to inflict in retreat; and

13 (D) mechanisms and systems, including
14 anti-corruption measures, are implemented to
15 ensure in the interim that Iraqi oil revenues are
16 properly collected and accounted for and used
17 in accordance with the wishes and best interests
18 of the Iraqi people;

19 (7) make provisions to establish an interim gov-
20 ernment and to ensure that it commands popular le-
21 gitimacy, much as the Loya Jirga has for President
22 Karzai's government in Afghanistan, in order that
23 the interim government may administer the Iraqi
24 state, draft a constitution, prepare and carry out

1 elections, maintain security, and execute other ap-
2 propriate functions;

3 (8) plan to organize debtor and donor con-
4 ferences in order to restructure Iraq's debt and post-
5 Persian Gulf War obligations and accumulate suffi-
6 cient resources to fund the needs of an interim gov-
7 ernment during transition; and

8 (9) develop plans for diplomatic initiatives to
9 take advantage of any opportunity to influence polit-
10 ical developments in the Middle East following a
11 conflict in Iraq, including—

12 (A) pressing for a resolution of the Israeli-
13 Palestinian conflict;

14 (B) engaging Syria and Lebanon in ending
15 their sponsorship of terrorism; and

16 (C) offering Iran the opportunity to dis-
17 cuss with the United States an end to Iran's
18 support of terrorism and weapons proliferation.

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